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Many transitional countries face the problem of establishing the rule of law in a weak justice
sector where a gulf separates local legal norms from national, constitutional norms that are
drawnlargely fromthe international sphere.AsacasestudyofEastTimor thisarticlechallenges
simplistic positivist notions about the normative hierarchy of laws within a constitutionally
bounded polity. It argues that in transitional countries such as East Timor legal pluralism is
important but must be properly tuned to serve the rule of law. Legal pluralism poses certain
dangerswhen it operateswithout any of the checks or balances that ensure accountability and
the promotion of constitutional values such as equality. The rule of law is not served by an
informal systemwhere there are no formal avenues of appeal and thusminimal accountability
and transparency. A more promising version of legal pluralism that comports with the rule of
law is one that empowers the state to monitor local decisions to ensure that they observe the
norms set out in East Timor’s Constitution.
Keywords
constitution; East Timor; legal pluralism; reconciling local and international norms; rule of
law
1. INTRODUCTION
When the United Nations Transitional Administration of East Timor (UNTAET)
beganoperating inEastTimoron16November1999, thedevastation in that country
wassimilartothatexperiencedbypost-warGermany.Aquarterofthepopulationhad
abandoned their homes, and the entire administrative and executive infrastructure
had disappeared. Most of the security, police, and administrative personnel had ﬂed
with the withdrawal of Indonesian forces, and courthouses, prisons, and police sta-
tionswere largelydestroyed.1 EastTimorhadexperienced24yearsof conﬂict follow-
ing the invasion by Indonesia in December 1975; prior to that event it had been col-
onized by the Portuguese for over 400 years. Approximately 1,400 peoplewere killed
in themonthsof violence that followed thepopular consultationballot of 30August
1999, when almost 80 per cent of East Timorese had voted for independence.
Six years later, after almost three years of UN administration and three years
of independence, the UN’s ‘Progress Report’ asserts that the ‘justice sector remains
∗ BA (Hons.); LLB (Hons.) (Adelaide); LLM (Toronto); lecturer, School of Law, University of Adelaide. I should
like to thank everyone who assisted me in East Timor, as well as Brendan Grigg, Katarina Grenfell, and
Cornelia Koch.
1. SeeH. Strohmeyer, ‘MakingMultilateral InterventionsWork:TheUNand theCreationofTransitional Justice
Systems in Kosovo and East Timor’, (2002) 25 Fletcher Forum ofWorld Affairs 107, at 109.
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particularly weak’ in East Timor.2 Speciﬁc problems are lack of capacity3 as well as
‘access to legal services and advice’.4 This weakness is illustrated by the fact that in
early 2005 itwas announced that all EastTimor’s local judges andpublicprosecutors
anddefenders failedanevaluationsetbythestate, thuscausingthemtobesuspended
fromworking in the courts. TheUNresponded inMay2005by assigning almost half
the civilian advisers authorized by the Security Council for theUN’sOfﬁce in Timor
Leste (UNOTIL) to the justice sector, demonstrating that overall it is considered to be
one of East Timor’s frailest sectors in its development since 1999. These problems in
the justice sector indicate that the road to establishing the rule of law in East Timor
is a difﬁcult one, needingmuch care and consideration.
The rule of law has become a catchphrase in the recent deliberations of the UN.
In the context of post-conﬂict societies, the UN Secretary-General recently deﬁned
the concept as meaning accountability at all levels to laws ‘that are publicly pro-
mulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated’, but the laws must also
be ‘consistent with international human rights norms and standards’.5 In addition,
there should be ‘adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the
law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of
powers, participation in decisionmaking, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness
and procedural and legal transparency’.6 This is a useful working deﬁnition for this
paper, but by nomeans an uncontroversial one.
It must be pointed out that the UN’s ‘Progress Report’ on East Timor refers to
problems facing the formal legal system in East Timor. It does not mention the role
played by local legal systems. Any deliberations on the rule of law in East Timor
should, however, take into account the fact that for centuries local legal systems,
using what is sometimes labelled ‘customary’ or ‘traditional’ law,7 have operated
to resolve community disputes in East Timor. Since the Portuguese occupation it
has unofﬁcially coexisted with the formal legal system, in a state known as ‘legal
pluralism’.8 Locals have come to depend more and more on local law as the formal
legal system negotiates a maze of difﬁculties. However, as this paper outlines, local
legal systems also suffer a myriad of problems, which further complicates the road
to establishing the rule of law.
2. Security Council, Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United NationsMission of Support in East
Timor (for the period from 10 November 2004 to 16 February 2005), S/2005/99 (2005), para. 5. Note that East
Timor’s ofﬁcial longnamesarenowRepublikaDemokratikaTimorLorosa’e (Tetum);RepublicaDemocratica
de Timor-Leste (Timor Leste is its ofﬁcial short name).
3. Security Council, End ofMandate Report of the Secretary-General on theUnitedNationsMission of Support
in East Timor (for the period from 17 February to 11May 2005), S/2005/310 (2005), para. 13.
4. See supra note 2, para. 18.
5. Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conﬂict and
Post-Conﬂict Societies, S/2004/616 (2004), at para. 6.
6. Ibid.
7. The use of these labels implies that they are not varied or subject to change: D. Mearns, ‘Looking BothWays:
Models for Justice in East Timor’, report prepared for Australian Legal Resources International, 2002, at 30–2.
Hence the term ‘local law’ is used in this paper.
8. According to S. E. Merry, legal pluralism ‘is generally deﬁned as a situation in which two or more legal
systems coexist in the same social ﬁeld’: ‘Legal Pluralism: Review Essay’, (1988) 22 Law and Society Review
869, at 870.
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The question posed by this paper is whether the current state of legal pluralism
assists or detracts from the process of establishing the rule of law. One view is
that one form of legal pluralism, where the state does not recognize the local legal
system for example, is detrimental to the rule of law because it subjects a person
to conﬂicting duties.9 This form of legal pluralism describes the current operation
of the two legal systems in East Timor, where the two systems coexist in an uneasy
relationshipdue to thedifferentvaluesunderlying their respectivenorms.This form
of legal pluralism can be distinguished from classic legal pluralism,10 where state
law formally recognizes and incorporates local law.
After outlining the basic tenets, including the beneﬁts and drawbacks, of both
formal law and local law, this paper considers in particular how the present state of
legalpluralismaffects the livesof localwomen, considered tohave the leastmeansof
access to justice in East Timor.11 It argues that the current state of legal pluralism in
EastTimordoesnotservetheruleof lawbecauseitoperateswithoutanyofthechecks
or balances that ensure accountability and the promotion of constitutional values
such as equality. The rule of law is not served by an informal system where there
are no formal avenues of appeal and thusminimal accountability and transparency.
Classic legal pluralism offers a more promising vehicle for the observance of the
rule of law as it empowers the state to monitor local decisions so as to ensure that
they observe the norms set out in East Timor’s Constitution.
In sum, through a case study of East Timor, this paper considers the problem,
faced by a number of transitional countries, of establishing the rule of law in aweak
justice sector where a gulf separates local legal norms from national constitutional
norms.12 In focusing on the role of local law in the process of establishing the rule
of law, it responds to the urging by the UN Secretary-General, in his report on the
rule of law in post-conﬂict societies, that due regard be ‘given to indigenous and
informal traditions for administering justice or settling disputes, to help them to
continue their often vital role and to do so in conformity with both international
standards and local tradition’.13 But, as the Secretary-General’s report acknowledges,
in these post-conﬂict situations, international institutions have had limited success
in imposing norms from ‘above’ on local justice sectors so as to ensure ‘conformity’
with international standards.14 Thus the process of attempting to reconcile local
9. See G. R.Woodman, ‘Legal Pluralism and the Search for Justice’, (1996) 40 Journal of African Law 152, at 160.
10. Sometimes referred to as ‘weak’ or ‘juristic’ legal pluralism. Woodman, supra note 9, at 157–8, refers to it as
‘state legal pluralism’,where, in the context of the impositionof colonial laws inAfrica, the state legal system
recognizes and incorporates parts of the bodies of customary law existing within that state’s claimed ﬁeld
of jurisdiction. He distinguishes it from what he refers to as ‘deep legal pluralism’, where state law coexists
with customary law.
11. According to the Judicial SystemsMonitoring Programme (JSMP), women’s access to justice in East Timor is
‘almost completely neglected’: see JSMP, ‘Access to Justice forWomen Victims’, July 2004, at 7.
12. This problem exists in Afghanistan. For example, its 2004 Constitution embodies norms such as equality
for men and women (Art. 22) which do not underlie the practices widely used by local decision-making
bodies (jirgas or shuras) inmost parts of Afghanistan. See L. Grenfell, ‘Paths to Transitional Justice for Afghan
Women’, (2004) 73 Nordic Journal of International Law 505, at 522, 529; M. H. Sadat, ‘The Implementation of
Constitutional Human Rights in Afghanistan’, (2004) 11(3)Human Rights Brief 48.
13. See supra note 5, at para. 36 (emphasis added).
14. Ibid., at para. 17. For example, the report states that ‘Countless pre-designed or imported projects, however
meticulously well reasoned and elegantly packaged, have failed the test of justice sector reform . . .wemust
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and constitutional normsneeds East Timor’s lawmakers to be the drivers of national
consultation, education, and open debate.
2. FORMAL LAW
2.1. Structure
On 25 October 1999 UNTAET’s mandate was drawn up, with the aim of rebuild-
ing all state institutions from the ground up, in particular the state legal system
and judiciary. UN Security Council Resolution 1272 states that UNTAET ‘will be
endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and will
be empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the ad-
ministration of justice’.15 This mandate was clearly based on the Security Council’s
assessment that East Timor did not have the capacity to administer itself.
The process of rebuilding East Timor’s legal system began with UNTAET’s ﬁrst
regulation in late November 1999, which set out that the applicable law was the
Indonesian law which operated prior to 25 October 1999 (the date of UNTAET’s
establishment) in so far as it did not conﬂict with standards set out in the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights and the six core UN human rights treaties.16 No
mention was made in this regulation of the applicability or inapplicability of local
laws. This was followed a few days later by UNTAET Regulation 1999/3,17 which
established the Transitional Judicial Service Commission and set out the powers of
the Transitional Administrator to appoint judges. In March 2000 the Transitional
Administrator issuedRegulation2000/11fortheorganizationofcourts inEastTimor,
stating in section 1 that ‘judicial authority in East Timor shall be exclusively vested
in courts that are established by law and composed of judges who are appointed
to these courts in accordance with UNTAET Regulation No 1999/3’.18 Subsequently
learnbetter how to respect and support local ownership, local leadership and a local constituency for reform,
while at the same time remaining faithful to United Nations norms and standards.’ This quotation captures
the tension inherent in the ﬁeld of transitional justice between the desire to make the process local while
requiring consistency and conformity with international norms.
15. UN Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999), para. 1. Prior to UNTAET, UN Security Council Resolution 1246 (UN Doc.
S/RES/1246 (1999)) set up the United NationsMission in East Timor (UNAMET) on 11 June 1999 to organize
and conduct the popular consultation. On 15 Sept. 1999, UN Security Council Resolution 1264 (UN Doc.
S/RES/1264 (1999)) established a multinational force (INTERFET) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter
to restore peace and security in East Timor, to facilitate humanitarian assistance and support UNAMET.
INTERFET arrived on 20 Sept. 1999.
16. See Ss. 2 and 3 of UNTAET Regulation No 1999/1, On the Authority of the Transitional Administration in
East Timor, UNTAET/REG/1999/1 (1999). The six core treaties are the 1966 International Covenant for Civil
and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171, and its Protocols; 1966 International Covenant for Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, 999 UNTS 3; 1965 International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 660 UNTS 195; 1979 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
(1980) 19 ILM 33; 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment,
(1984) 23 ILM 1027; 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, (1989) 28 ILM 1448. In addition, six
Indonesian statutes were declared inapplicable and capital punishment was abolished.
17. On the Establishment of a Transitional Judicial Service Commission, UNTAET/REG/1999/3 (1999). For an
analysis of the establishment of East Timor’s formal criminal legal system see S. Linton, ‘Rising from the
Ashes: The Creation of a Viable Criminal Justice System in East Timor’ (2001) 25Melbourne University Law
Review 122.
18. Emphasis added. UNTAET subsequently established District Administrations in the 13 districts established
by Indonesia and created 60 sub-district ofﬁces, each of which contain about eight villages. In June 2000 the
Special Panels for Serious Crimes were established pursuant to s. 1 of UNTAET Regulation 2000/15, On the
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four district courts were established, in Dili, Bacau, Suai, and Oecussi.19 Together
with the Court of Appeal, these courts currently constitute the formal state legal
system in East Timor.20
Since independence on 20May 2002, Indonesian law has continued to be applic-
able as far as it is consistent with the Constitution, international law, UNTAET Reg-
ulations, and East Timorese law.21 This last category comprises about 80 acts passed
either by East Timor’s National Parliament or by the government using its limited
power to pass laws by decree, provided in Article 96 of the Constitution. While the
ofﬁcial languages are set out in the Constitution as Tetum and Portuguese,22 East
Timorese law so far has been published in its entirety only in one of the ofﬁcial
languages, Portuguese, used by only 5 per cent of the population. Few laws, perhaps
three, have been published in Tetum,23 used by 60–80 per cent of the population.24
TheCourt ofAppeal and theNational Parliament are being scrutinized by various
actors in the judicial sector to ensure that they are upholding and enforcing con-
stitutional values and principles. A recent test case for the rule of law has been the
draft Law on Freedom of Assembly and Demonstration, whichwas approved by the
parliament in late December 2004. Pursuant to his powers under Article 149(1) of
the Constitution, President Xanana Gusma˜o referred this bill to the Court of Appeal
in March 2005 for anticipatory constitutional review as a result of concerns that
it violated Article 42 of the Constitution, protecting the right to demonstrate and
assemble, and Article 24, which limits restrictions being placed on constitutionally
protected rights. In May 2005 the Court of Appeal held only two of the eight chal-
lenged provisions to be constitutionally defective,25 but one prominent actor in the
Establishment of Special Panels for Special Crimes, UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (2000), to exercise jurisdiction
over the ‘serious crimes’ of murder and sexual offences committed between 1 Jan. 1999 and 25 Oct. 1999.
This limit on temporal jurisdiction does not apply to genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
torture, which are also within the subjectmatter jurisdiction of the Special Panels. In 2001, the Commission
on Reception, Truth and Reconciliation was established pursuant to UNTAET Regulation 2001/10, On the
EstablishmentofaCommissionforReception,TruthandReconciliationinEastTimor,UNTAET/REG/2001/10
(2001).
19. UNTAET/REG/2000/11 (2000), On the Organization of Courts in East Timor, initially stipulated the estab-
lishment of eight district courts (s. 7), but this was later amended to four courts by UNTAET/REG/2000/14
(2000) Amending Regulation No 2000/11 (s. 2).
20. East Timor’s highest court is the Supreme Court of Justice, but under s. 164 of the 2002 Constitution the
Court of Appeal can exercise its functions until such time as it is established. The JSMP reports that the
Court of Appeal did not function from November 2001 to June 2003 due to the lack of judges. This meant
that no appeals could be heard during this 18-month period: JSMP, ‘Overview of the Justice Sector: March
2005’, March 2005, at 20.
21. This is set out in RDTL Law No 10/2003, Interpretation of Section 1 of Law No 2/2002, of 7 August, and
Sources of Law, s. 2, which clears up some confusion following Law No 2/2002. The applicable Indonesian
law must have been in force prior to 25 Oct. 1999, and UNTAET Regulations apply as long as they have not
been repealed. The application of international law is explained in section 5 of this paper. See also Art. 165
of the 2002 Constitution, which provides that ‘Laws and regulations in force in East Timor shall continue
to be applicable to all matters except to the extent that they are inconsistent with the Constitution of the
principles contained herein.’
22. See Art. 13 of the Constitution.
23. JSMP, supra note 20, at 19. This has prompted the JSMP to assert that ‘laws are often not widely disseminated
andmisunderstanding and lack of uniform application occur’, at 6.
24. See JSMP, ‘Impact of the Language Directive on the Courts in East Timor’, August 2004, at 7.
25. Unpublisheddecision,FileNo1/2005,9May2005.Thedecisioncanbe foundatwww.unmiset.org. Parliament
passed the law on 18 July 2005.
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justice sector, the Judicial SystemsMonitoring Programme (JSMP), still believes that
the law unduly restricts the right to assemble and demonstrate.26
2.2. Problems faced by the formal legal system
Theformal legalsystemsuffersamazeofdifﬁculties:ﬁrst, thereareproblemsrelating
to the implementation of the formal law and, second, there are problems that are
more normative in nature.
One of themost obvious obstacles to the implementation of formal law has been
the lack of legal expertise. Since 2000, 22 local judges have been appointed for up
to four years on a probationary basis.27 In 2004 these judges were required by Law
No 8/2002, as amended by Law No 11/2004, to undergo and pass an evaluation,
both written and practical. It was announced on 25 January 2005 that all the local
judges had failed the written evaluation, with the result that they were suspended
from hearing cases.28 These problems were exacerbated by the announcement on
25May 2005 that all the local public prosecutors and defenders had also failed their
evaluations.29
The weakness of East Timor’s formal legal system can be traced not only to its
relative infancy, seen in the failure of capacity building, but also to its Portuguese co-
lonial heritage and the continuing inﬂuence thereof over East Timor’s government.
Language is a serious problem that impedes real access to state courts, a right which
is guaranteed in East Timor’s Constitution.30 Apart from the ofﬁcial languages of
Tetum and Portuguese, 19 different languages are spoken in East Timor.31 For a
number of years after UNTAET’s arrival, the formal legal system used the ofﬁcial
languages, aswell as allowing the use of English and Bahasa Indonesia on occasions.
On 27 February 2004, however, the Superior Council of the Judiciary ordered
that from the end of 2004 all court documents had to be written in the ofﬁcial
languages.32 This directive effectively prohibits the use in court of documents in
Bahasa Indonesia,which isusedby20–40percentof thepopulation,mainlyyounger
East Timorese, unlike Portuguese, which is usedmainly by the older generation and
26. E-mail correspondence with the JSMP, 8 Aug. 2005.
27. JSMP, Justice Update, Period 24 January–1 February 2005 Issue No 3/2005, at 2.
28. Note that 19 of the judges have appealed against their results. The President of the Superior Court of the
Judiciary must make a determination of the validity of the appeal and appoint three judges to hear it: JSMP,
supra note 20, at 12. Despite this, the President of the Court of Appeal announced that four of the judges
would continue to work as judges but that they would be required to attend a two-year training course at
the Judicial Training Centre. The four international judges, whowere previously assigned 80 per cent of the
caseload, presumably now have total responsibility for handling the backlog, which one source reports as
having reached 3,000 cases, and will continue to shoulder the bulk of the cases until the judicial training is
complete: JSMP, supra note 20, at 13.
29. This leaves one international prosecutor and one international public defender in each district court, aswell
as a handful of local prosecutorswho are yet to sit the evaluation, until such time asmore lawyers are trained
to become probationary prosecutors and defenders: Security Council, supra note 3, at para 13. These failed
evaluations, which have produced some national disappointment, make it clear that ‘capacity building’ has
not succeeded in East Timor’s formal justice sector and that the sector is very weak. For a view as to why
capacity building has failed in East Timor see S. Katzenstein, ‘Hybrid Tribunals: Searching for Justice in East
Timor’, (2003) 16Harvard Human Rights Journal 245, at 265 et seq.
30. Art. 26 of the Constitution provides: ‘Access to the courts is guaranteed to all for the defence of their legally
protected rights and interests. Justice shall not be denied for insufﬁcient economic means.’
31. See G. Hull, ‘The Languages of East Timor: Some Basic Facts’ (InstitutoNacional de Linguı´stica, Universidade
Nacional Timor Lorosa’e), available at http://www.shlrc.mq.edu.au/∼leccles/langs.html.
32. Presumably in order to reduce the huge cost of translation and its associated delays. See JSMP, supra note 24.
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those in exile during the Indonesian occupation.33 While Tetum is themost widely
spoken language, its usefulness as a court language is undermined by the fact that
its lexicon includes few technical legal words. According to one source, the written
examination set for the local judges, public prosecutors, and defenders was not
written in Bahasa Indonesia, the language in which the majority of their work has
so far been conducted, but in Portuguese.34 Overall it is not surprising that language
difﬁculties have ‘weakened public conﬁdence’ in the formal legal system.35 While
local court staff are struggling to follow the process, the public has little hope of
doing so, boding ill for the rule of law.
Chronic delay has been another associated problem. The maxim ‘justice delayed
is justice denied’ is the commonly held perception among locals of the formal legal
system. The view is that the formal legal process takes too long to resolve issues.36
This perhaps arises from the bureaucracy involved in the formal legal system and
the fact that even before the suspension of the local judges, only one of East Timor’s
four district courts, the Dili court, was functioning properly.37
The pressure on district courts has meant that priority has been given to hearing
criminal cases;38 fewcivil caseshavebeendealtwithby thecourts,most civilmatters
33. Of the two ofﬁcial languages, the lusophone international judges favour Portuguese, and there are accounts
that some international judges have even refused to allow translations into Tetum to enable the public
prosecutor and defender to follow the court process. See JSMP, supra note 20, at 16–18. The Portuguese
government currently offers free Portuguese language tuition for those locals working in government and
NGO spheres, but it will obviously take a number of years for locals to use Portuguese with skill and
conﬁdence.
34. Translations into Tetum were available but were reportedly confusing and unreliable. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that a question written in Portuguese which read ‘Which are the 10 Articles of the Constitution
that contain Human Rights?’ was translated into Tetum to read ‘WhichHuman Right is contained in Article
10 of the Constitution?’: S. Marshall, ‘The East Timorese Judiciary: At the Threshold of Self Sufﬁciency?
Update’, conference paper, June 2005, available at www.jsmp.minihub.org, at 3. In addition, answers given
in Portuguese were rewarded more highly than those written in Tetum: interview with the JSMP, Dili,
15 June 2005. Note that the criteria for the judges’ evaluations, set out in ss. 57 and 58 of Law No 8/2002, do
not explicitly stipulate Portuguese language skills. In contrast, these skills are stipulated in the case of public
defenders andprosecutors: seeGovernmentDecreesNo8/2004 and9/2004, ss. 4 and3 respectively.According
to theUSStateDepartment,most trial judges andprosecutorswere trained in theBahasa Indonesia language,
while most appellate judges speak little or no Bahasa Indonesia: see supra note 29, s. 1(e).
35. See JSMP, ‘Findings and Recommendations: Workshop on Formal and Local Justice Systems in East Timor’,
July 2002, at 11.
36. The Asia Foundation’s survey found that 37 per cent of East Timorese participants believe this: ‘Law and
Justice in East Timor: A Survey of CitizenAwareness andAttitudes Regarding Law and Justice in East Timor’,
February 2004, at 73. See also JSMP, ‘Findings and Recommendations:Workshop on Formal and Local Justice
Systems in East Timor’, July 2002, Ann. III.
37. See Asia Foundation, supra note 36, at 10. According to the JSMP, ‘extremely limited proceedings occurred in
the district courts outside ofDili’ until the end of 2004 because of a lack of staff and funding: JSMP, ‘Overview
of the Courts in East Timor in 2004’, 17 Dec. 2004. A report of the JSMP found that in 2003 in the Dili District
Court it took an average of over 24 weeks for an indictment to be laid after the commission of a crime, and
that it took an average time of a further 23 weeks and 6 days for the indictment to be decided. An appeal
takes on average another four months. See JSMP, ‘Case FlowManagement: A Statistical Analysis, 2003–mid
2004’, August 2004, Ann. I, at 26. The length of the process can be explained partly by poor organization,
in particular case management. According to the JSMP, once the police gather statements from victims and
witnesses, they then send the matter to the prosecutor who in turn asks the investigating judge to issue an
arrest warrant. The police perform no follow-up when a matter is handed on to the prosecutor, leaving it to
the victim or an NGO to ensure that each ofﬁce deals with thematter and passes it on to the next: interview
with the JSMP, Dili, 15 June 2005.
38. According to the JSMP, three of the four district courts heard no civil cases in 2004: JSMP, ‘Overview of the
Courts in East Timor in 2004’, supra note 37, at 6. The JSMP was unable to access details for the Dili District
Court.
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thus presumably being dealt with at the local level.While in the circumstances this
setting of priorities seems reasonable, it may have the effect of discouraging foreign
investment.
With regard to cases dealing with offences against women heard in the Dili
District Court in 2003, the JSMP found that ‘postponements and delays marred
the vast majority of these serious proceedings’.39 In fact, of 148 domestic violence
cases reported, 104 of the complaintswerewithdrawn, partly because of the lengthy
delays.40 Besides delay, there are normative obstacles: cultural beliefs commonly
force women to withdraw domestic violence complaints from the formal legal
system. This is because perpetrators view the instigation of such complaints in the
formal sphere as a cause for divorce, which carries a serious social stigma in East
Timor’s religious society. Generally speaking, these cultural issues make women
reluctant to report domestic violence to the formal sphere and they generally opt to
use the local sphere.41
Thegovernment is in theprocessofattempting toaddress someof theseproblems.
It is currently drafting four new legal codes; this bundle includes a penal code
to replace the Indonesian Penal Code, which contains three speciﬁc provisions
dealing with domestic violence.42 The government proposes to pass these codes
by decree, thus bypassing the opportunity for real debate in the parliament and in
the community as to the appropriate offences to be deﬁned and procedures to be
applied under civil and criminal law. At the same time the government is drafting
another law on domestic violence, separate from the decree law, to be debated in
and approved by parliament. An earlier draft of this law, which focused strongly on
educating thepublic to the effect that domestic violence is a crime,was the subject of
much community consultation.43 However, it has since been superseded by a draft
heavily inﬂuenced by Portuguese law rather than local needs.44 The current draft of
theproposed ‘lawagainstdomestic violence’ readsmore likeapolicydocument than
legislation addressing a serious practical problem. The need for two different formal
laws on domestic violence is not clear, and it is arguable that normative confusion
is obscuring a proper response to this problem.
39. On average such cases take 274 days to be processed through the formal legal system: JSMP, ‘Women in the
Formal Justice Sector: Report on the Dili District Court’, 7 April 2004, at 24.
40. Ibid., at 16; JSMP, supra note 11, at 21.
41. Thiswas conﬁrmed in interviewswithManuela LeongPereira, theDirector of Fokupers, East Timor’s leading
women’s rights NGO, andwithMaria Agnes Bere, Co-ordinator of theWomen’s Justice Unit, JSMP, in Dili on
17 and 14 June 2005 respectively.
42. Arts. 148–50 of the draft penal code. According to the JSMP, these provisions are limited in the range of
relationships that are included. For example, for harsher penalties to apply under Art. 149, themaltreatment
must occur between a married couple or a couple that has cohabited for than three years. See JSMP, ‘The
Draft Penal Code’, March 2004, at 14.
43. For a copy of the previous draft law, see http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/new/legislation.htm.
44. The law urges family unity but it does not spell out that domestic violence is a crime, nor does it appear to
be designed to assist victims. In its current draft form, it is vague and confusing, placingmost responsibility
for combating domestic violence on the Ofﬁce for the Promotion of Equality as well as various NGOs. It is
accompanied by a proposed law ‘regarding provision of maintenance’ and a decree law ‘regarding support
centres for victims of domestic violence’.
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3. LOCAL LAW
There is no evidence that whenUNTAET began to operate there was any regulation
or policy regarding the role of local law. Possibly this was due to the limited detailed
knowledge of the local justice systems and how they function.45 The result of this
initial UN policy vacuum with regard to the role of local law was that a range of
approaches was used in relation to local law by various UN staff. For example, some
CivPol (International Civilian Police) ofﬁcers used local law, while others refused
to do so,46 leading predictably to ‘a certain degree of confusion, particularly among
the East Timorese’.47 It was not until September 2001 that a workshop was held to
discuss the manner in which local law could be used to complement the formal
justice system.48 According toHohe andNixon, this interest in local lawwas largely
due to pressure relating to land disputes, and in the following month UNTAET
prepared a report on establishing a co-ordinated approach to the issue of local law.49
At this time it became apparent that local processes could be utilized to advantage.
3.1. History of local law
Many experts assert that during the periods of occupation and colonization the
formal legal systems never held great sway in East Timor, explaining the relative
weakness of the formal legal system today and the continued operation of local
law.50
Portuguese colonial rule began in 1556,51 but it is argued that it did not have
a signiﬁcant impact on local power structures and systems of law52 because the
Portuguesewere primarily interested in trade, the prevention of large-scale conﬂict,
45. The ﬁrst detailed report on local law came out in 2001. See D. Mearns, ‘Variations on a Theme: Coalitions
of Authority in East Timor’, report prepared for Australian Legal Resources International, 2001. See also
Mearns, supra note 7; T. Hohe and R. Nixon, ‘Reconciling Justice: “Traditional” Law and State Justice in East
Timor, Final Report’, report prepared for the United States Institute of Peace, 2003, at 40. Presumably this
initial policy vacuum resulted from a combination of a lack of resources and poor communication channels
between the local community and the UN administration.
46. See Hohe and Nixon, supra note 45, at 40. Note that from early 2000 onwards, UNTAET showed interest
in traditional mechanisms of conﬂict resolution in its approach to policing: see Security Council, Report
of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (for the period
27 January–26 July 2000), UN Doc S/2000/738, (26 July 2000), at para. 46.
47. See Hohe and Nixon, supra note 45.
48. Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on theUnitedNations Transitional Administration in East
Timor (for the period from 25 July to 15 October 2001), S/2001/983 (2001), at para. 18.
49. Hohe andNixon relate that the reportwas prepared by theOfﬁce of theNational SecurityAdvisor: supranote
45, at 41. The question of resolving land disputes using both local law and state law is beyond the scope of
this paper, but see E. Urresta and R. Nixon, Timor Leste Land Law Program, ‘Report on Research Findings and
Policy Recommendations for a Legal Framework for Land DisputeMediation’, February 2004; D. Fitzpatrick,
Land Claims in East Timor (2002).
50. See Hohe andNixon, supra note 45, at 27, and J. A. Berlie, ‘A Concise Legal History of East Timor’, in Studies in
Languages and Cultures of East Timor (2000), vol. 3, 138 et seq.
51. This is the date of the ﬁrst Portuguese settlement at Lifau (in present-day Oecussi). It was not until the
beginning of the eighteenth century that a Portuguese governor was appointed in East Timor. For a history
of East Timor see J. G. Taylor, Indonesia’s ForgottenWar: The HiddenHistory of East Timor (1991); J. Dunn, Timor:
A People Betrayed (1996), ch. 2.
52. SeeHoheandNixon,supranote45,at27.Moregenerally,Taylorstatesthat ‘thesalientfeaturesofEastTimorese
society remained in themid-twentieth centurymuch as they had been at the time of the Portuguese arrival’:
Taylor, supra note 51, at 15.
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and the collection of taxes.53 The Portuguese ruled through a system of ‘indirect
colonial rule’, which involved the bestowal of military power on local chiefs who
were expected to provide strong loyalty to Portugal and maintain law and order.54
Very few laws were promulgated for East Timor.55 Indirect rule allowed local legal
systems to continue operating with little outside interference.56
At the turn of the twentieth century, Portuguese rule became more direct. Berlie
states that up until this time ‘the local native authorities had considerable judicial
power’.57 The beginning of direct rule, alongside the demise of the Portuguese
monarchy with the founding of the Republic of Portugal in 1910, sparked some
rebellion among the local chiefs whose loyalty was tied, conceptually at least, to
the king of Portugal. After the Second World War, East Timor formally became an
‘overseas province’ of Portugal rather than a colony.58 It had nine administrative
districts59 and ‘four courts of justice existed inDili, Bacau, Suai andOecussi’.60What
is not clear iswhether Portugal set up separate ‘native’ courts for chiefs to administer
‘native’ law to the local population, as occurred in colonies ruled by the British and
French in parts of colonial Africa.61
The subsequent imposition of the Indonesian legal systemduring the occupation
(1976–99) had a greater impact onEast Timorese society.62 East Timorwas subject to
laws adopted by Indonesia’s national legislative council, and only civilmatterswere
left to be dealt with at local level.63 According to one report, during the occupation
Indonesia passed a law that ‘permitted no local traditional institution to exist apart
from those adopted by the national legislative body’.64 The local population viewed
the Indonesian legal system with deep distrust, due to widespread perception of its
53. Hohe and Nixon, supra note 45, at 27.
54. See Berlie, supra note 50, at 145. Geoffrey Hull states that ‘Portuguese rule was accepted because, before the
mid-nineteenth century at least, there was minimal interference in indigenous affairs, and this allowed the
local kings to maintain the social status quo.’ G. Hull, ‘East Timor and Indonesia: The Cultural Factors of
Incompatibility’, in Studies in Languages and Cultures of East Timor (2000), vol. 4, 60. Taylor comments that
indirect rule was partly attributable to the fact that the Portuguese were unable to administer successfully
the interior: see supra note 51, at 10.
55. Berlie, supra note 50, at 149.
56. Hohe and Nixon, supra note 45, at 27. Taylor states that conﬂict in the region between the Dutch, the
Portuguese, and the Topasses (amestizo group from the Portuguese settlement of Palau Solor and Larantuka
(Flores)) in the eighteenth century left ‘Timorese society relatively free from incursion and disruption’: supra
note 51, at 5. He comments that East Timorese communities were successful in restricting ‘Topasse and
European inﬂuence and control to the political sphere of princely kinship alliances’: ibid., at 9.
57. See Berlie, supra note 50, at 147.
58. Ibid., at 148, where Berlie says that a ‘politico-administrative statute for Timor was published in the Organic
Law of the Portuguese Overseas (no. 2066)’ in June 1953. This was during the dictatorship of Anto´nio de
Oliveira Salazar (1932–68). It is possible that this issuewas formalized earlier by the PortugueseConstitution
in 1951. However, see J. Dunn, East Timor: Rough Passage to Independence (2003), 32, where Dunn says that this
status was declared in 1963.
59. The nine districts were Dili, Lautem, Viqueque, Bacau, Manatuto, Suro, Ermera, Bobonaro, and Oecussi.
60. See Berlie, supra note 50, at 150. Some of the records of the Dili court show punishments beingmeted out in
the nineteenth century to soldiers, but these soldiers were possibly Portuguese and not local East Timorese:
ibid.
61. On native courts and indirect rule see M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of
Late Colonialism (1996).
62. East Timor became annexed as the 27th province of Indonesia in 1976.
63. See Hohe and Nixon, supra note 45, at 27.
64. S. R. Quast, International Legal Assistance Consortium, ‘Report on East Timor’, March 2002, at 22.
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corruption.65 Thenotionof the separationofpowersdidnot applyunder Indonesian
rule, according towhichpolicewereperceived asboth lawmakers and lawenforcers.
More broadly, the concept of the rule of law, as deﬁned above by the UN Secretary-
General, was not understood or respected by the government of Suharto, in power
in Indonesia for most of the period of its occupation of East Timor.66
For these reasons, locals had no experience or understanding of the rule of law
and would rarely access the formal legal system, in particular during Portuguese
rule, except when it came to reporting serious cases such as murder.67 The formal
legal system was seen as a last resort. Overall, Berlie sums up that ‘The continual
inﬂuence of traditional law, adat, shows that colonial and indigenous legal and
political systems existed in parallel.’68 Thus the post-colonial legacy was one of two
separate legal systems operating in parallel without recognizing each other.69
The period between the popular consultation ballot and the arrival of UNTAET
was one of approximately two and a half months, longer in some less accessible
rural areas. During this time the local population relied on local law.70 In addi-
tion, they relied on the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT), whose
inﬂuence continued after UNTAET arrived.71 This is expressed by the words of one
government ofﬁcial: ‘In 1999–2000 the legal way was via the CNRT . . . only seldom
people went to UNTAET and PKF. If we go to UNTAET, there is a difference in
culture . . . there is international laws and not normal local ways’.72 Even after the
CNRT was dissolved in mid-2001, locals and CivPol ofﬁcers would still approach its
former members for assistance with matters of local law.73 Mearns reports that as
late as 2002 some local village heads spoke to the effect that they believed there
was ‘no law at present’, demonstrating that they had little trust or understanding
65. See Hohe and Nixon, supra note 45, at 7; see also 26–7.
66. See T. Lindsey, ‘Indonesia: Devaluing Asian Values, Rewriting Rule of Law’, in R. Peerenboom (ed.), Asian
Discourses of Rule of Law: Theories and Implementation of Rule of Law in Twelve Asian Countries, France and the US
(2000), 286–323. See also International Commission of Jurists, ‘Ruler’s Law: The Report of the International
Commission of Jurists Mission to Indonesia’, October 1999.
67. Hohe and Nixon, supra note 45, at 19, 26.
68. Ibid., at 149. This is conﬁrmed by Taylor, who states that the ‘two political systems, the colonial and the
indigenous coexisted’ but in a ‘rather uneasy truce’, supra note 51, at 12.Adat is the Indonesian word for the
sacred laws or belief systems on which local law is based.
69. While the local system continued informally to serve locals who lived in village structures, particularly in
rural areas, the Portuguese legal system predominantly seems to have served the non-East Timorese as well
as someurban East Timorese.What is apparent is that local systems of law remained strong and operational,
although they could not escape outside inﬂuence entirely.
70. According toapriest fromtheOecussidistrict, ‘In thevillagesafterSeptember1999, itwascustomary lawthat
asserted itself quickly. Thiswasnatural andnot surprisingbecause – thougheverythinghadbeendestroyed–
through tradition and culture the local law lived on in strength inside people’s heads’ (November 2002),
quoted in Hohe and Nixon, supra note 45, at 32.
71. In early 1999 different nationalistic political parties gathered under the umbrella of the CNRT in order
to assist East Timor in its transition to a democratically elected government. In August 1999 the largest
resistance party, Fretelin, split from the CNRT and the remaining CNRT dissolved in June 2001, some weeks
before the ﬁrst general election on 30 Aug. 2001.
72. Bobonaro District, November 2002: quoted in Hohe and Nixon, supra note 45, at 36. According to Hohe and
Nixon, the CNRT was the only obvious power at this time, as it possessed an organizational structure that
stretched from the hamlet to the national level; it ‘was rooted in principles of local administration and law’,
30, 38.
73. Ibid., at 36.
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of the formal legal system.74 This comment needs to be considered in the context
of the entry into force on 20 May 2002 of East Timor’s Constitution, a month after
Xanana Gusma˜o won the presidential elections. It illustrates the amount of time
that it takes to communicate to locals the existence and relevance of the new formal
legal system, as well as the degree of community consultation that took place in the
drafting and enactment of East Timor’s Constitution.75
3.2. Themain tenets of local law
Some of the salient features of local law in East Timor, sometimes referred to as
adat,76 need to be brieﬂy outlined so as to give a sense of how local law differs from
the formal legal system. One of the challenges here is that it is generally agreed that
there is no single local system of law that applies across all regions of East Timor.
Instead there are numerous local systems, and while they share some underlying
principles, commonalities should not be assumed.77
Anthropologists and other experts have identiﬁed anumber of common features,
some of which are as follows. First, law is part of a broader social order based on
the values of kinship, marriage relations, and the exchange of certain goods. The
marriage relationship, for example, is pivotal in local communities as producing a
bondbetween two families, understoodas ‘houses’. The initialmarriage relationship
is established through an exchange of values between the two families, symbolized
in exchange goods, commonly translated as ‘bride price’.78 This exchange is a central
aspect of the local systems of ‘value circulation’.
Second, ‘wrongdoing’ in local East Timorese communities is understood as being
a disturbance of the system of ‘value circulation’.79 If an individual commits a
crime, it causes an interruption in the ﬂow of value and an imbalance in the socio-
cosmic system. The threat of someone breaking the social rules is perceived as very
serious. For example, if a family member refuses to marry a designated person, this
is considered a greater offence to the social value system than an act of domestic
violence.80
74. Mearns, supra note 7, at 38.
75. SeeA. J. Regan, ‘ConstitutionMaking inEastTimor:MissedOpportunities?’;D. d.C. B. Soares, ‘TheChallenges
of Drafting a Constitution’, in D. d. C. B. Soares et al. (eds.), Elections and Constitution Making in East Timor
(2003); and A. Baltazar, ‘An Overview of the Constitution Drafting Process in East Timor’, (2004) East Timor
Law Journal, available at http://www.eastimorlawjournal.org/Articles/alipioonetconstitution.html.
76. See supra note 68.
77. While some of the practices of these local systems of law may have been used for generations, it is in
my view best not to use the term ‘customary law’ or ‘traditional law’ because not all practices of local
law are necessarily customary or traditional. Prior to the UN’s arrival, few studies had been undertaken of
East Timor’s local systems of law; this situation has now changed, allowing for some detailed analysis and
understanding for those from outside. A number of workshops and studies have been conducted in the
past few years on the subject of the beneﬁts and drawbacks of using these local systems of law. See JSMP,
‘Findings and Recommendations: Workshop on Formal and Local Justice Systems in East Timor’, July 2002;
Asia Foundation, supra note 36.
78. One of the families acts as ‘Wife Giver’ and one as ‘Wife Taker’: Hohe and Nixon, supra note 45, at 13. They
state that ‘Although a bride price contains the idea of payment for a received good, most Timorese strongly
deny that this is what happens in the context of marriage, as both parties exchange goods to the other’. See
also Berlie, supra note 50, at 141–2; Fitzpatrick, supra note 49, at 31–2.
79. Hohe and Nixon, supra note 45, at 17.
80. Ibid.
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Third, local dispute resolution processes generally operate in such a way that
matters to be resolved between two individuals of different families are ﬁrst taken to
the elders of the two families. This processmay involve the lian nainordato (different
words for ‘holder ofwords’) ruling over the proceedings. If this does not succeed, the
families may refer the matter to the chefe d’aldeia (the hamlet chief). If this process
is not successful then the matter is referred to the chefe do suco (the village chief).
Either of these leadersmay decide to convene ameeting of a ‘council of elders’ in the
village, which will include the customary leaders. Sometimes the matter may also
be referred to a trusted local priest, while the police are generally considered to be
the last resort.81
Local legal systems follow a path of restorative rather than punitive justice.
Anthropologist DavidMearns explains the difference thus:
[J]ustice is never simply a matter of punishment but rather of compensation for the
victimandthevictim’s familywhosehonourhadbeendamagedbythecrimeoroffence.
Moreover, the acts of individuals as perpetrators have consequences not just for them
alone, but also for their familieswhose shameanddishonour result fromanymember’s
crime or misbehaviour.82
Justice and punishment are understood in a collective sense. The debt payment
owed by the perpetrator for a crime committed ismade in the name of the family as
a whole and can be paid by the perpetrator’s family. For example, the crime of arson
may involve reimbursing the victims’ family to the extent that the victim’s family is
offered the perpetrator’s family belongings.83 Committing a crime is seen as being
more than an individual act of transgression; it is seen as a community problem.84
The debt created by the act must be settled before any form of reconciliation can be
found within the community.85
Reconciliation is seen as ‘One of the most important stages following the con-
sensus on a compensation for a crime and the payment or execution of the
punishment’.86
A reconciliation ceremony involves the local ritual authorities, as their involve-
ment ensures ancestral participation in a peace agreement, which is considered to
be important. Theperpetrator, and sometimes also the victim’s family, thenprovides
goods for a reconciliation ceremony.
Inmanylocal systemsthepunishmentemphasizes theshamingof theperpetrator
in order to ‘cover the victim’s shame’.87 While detention is an act of shaming in
Western legal systems, this form of shaming is not understood as such by the East
Timorese. Locals see detentionas aperiodwhen theperpetrator ‘becomes fat’, in that
they are provided with food and shelter while others must work for these things.
81. SeeMearns, supranote 7, at 39; A. Swaine, International Rescue Society, ‘Traditional Justice andGender Based
Violence’, August 2003, at 20–1.
82. Mearns, supra note 7, at 43.
83. Swaine, supra note 81, at 21.
84. Hohe and Nixon, supra note 45, at 22.
85. Mearns, supra note 7, at 43.
86. Hohe and Nixon, supra note 45, at 22.
87. Swaine, supra note 81, at 21.
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This means that the Western path of removing the perpetrator from the scene for
the purposes of imprisonment does not produce a resolution at the local level.88
In sum, local systems of law in East Timor are based on value systems very
different from Western legal systems. Violent assault may not be considered to be
serious, while, in contrast, theft, for example, is considered to be a serious crime.89
A local form of arbitration is used to deal with disputes, when a chefe listens to the
parties before informing them of the required means of reconciliation.
Inorder tounderstand theoperationof local lawand legalpluralisminEastTimor
in greater depth, it is necessary to consider both the beneﬁts and the drawbacks of
local systems of law.
4. THE BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF LOCAL SYSTEMS OF LAW
4.1. The beneﬁts
Themain beneﬁts of using the local systems of law are outlined as follows.
4.1.1. Speed and accessibility of local dispute resolution
Without doubt, local dispute mechanisms are more accessible than formal state
mechanisms, since each hamlet and village has its own, saving locals in remote
areas from having to walk for hours simply to make a complaint.90 Accessibility to
the formal legal system is also hindered by cost: the relatively high cost involved in
lodging a civil case91 means that locals are reluctant, or simply unable to afford, to
bringdisputes to the formalcourts.92 Formal legalenforcement isanoption intheory
only for most people and in particular those living in rural and isolated regions.93
In contrast, local systems of law are relatively cost-free94 and use the language that
is locally spoken.
4.1.2. Sensitivity to local context
Unlike the formal legal system, local legal systems reﬂect the system of circulation
of values, discussed above, that exist in local East Timorese societies. For this reason
they can bemore sensitive to the local context inwhich the conﬂict arises andmore
comprehensible to local people. Swaine says that women opt to use local justice
‘because of its basis in their culture and the fact that it is a familiar and known
concept’.95
88. Hohe and Nixon, supra note 45, at 64.
89. Its punishmentmay involve the replacement of the stolen goods in addition to compensation. Swaine, supra
note 81, at 21.
90. There are many remote areas of East Timor where roads are difﬁcult, and transport and communication by
telephone areminimal. The formal legal system is evenmore inaccessible for the inhabitants ofOecussi, East
Timor’s enclave that lies inWest Timor, which is particularly isolated. It appears that neither criminal trials
nor civil matters were heard at the Oecussi District Court in 2004 – see JSMP, ‘Case Flow andManagement’,
supra note 37, at 12–13.
91. Court costs are set out inDecree LawNo 15/2003. For example, amatter involving a sumof $500 incurs costs
of $26. The average wage for an East Timorese worker is currently US$2–5 per day.
92. Asia Foundation, supra note 36, at 10.
93. Swaine, supra note 81, at 60. On women’s access to formal law, see JSMP, supra note 11.
94. But note that the parties are often expected to supply the holders of local law with food while their matter
is being resolved: see Swaine, supra note 81, at 60.
95. Swaine, supra note 81, at 4.
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4.1.3. The acceptance of local resolutions and appeasement of customary leaders
Local resolutions are locally accepted, whereas decisions made by formal district
courtsarenotalwaysacceptedandunderstoodat thelocal level.Thisderives fromthe
fact that ‘the “wrong” person might have made the judgment, and that the [formal]
process is alien and that the punishment does not deliver the desired result’.96
Mearns reports that in the Bacau district locals were threatening court staff and
witnesses:
It was said that one old man berated the judge for daring to stand there and tell him
what to do.His reasoningwas that in the traditional system the judge’s father had been
subordinate to the old man and now his son should also accept his authority. It was
said that the young judge was shamed into stunned silence.97
Another reasonwhy formaldecisionsarenotautomatically accepted is that locals
are being put on trial by the formal legal system ‘for acts they never realised were
criminal, and before the basic concepts of the new legal system have even begun
to permeate the social fabric’.98 The act of removing a case from the local to the
formal level may insult the holders of local law.99 Given the close-knit nature of
East Timorese village society, it is important to involve local ritual leaders in the
decision-making process, otherwise they may invoke the supernatural to support
their position.100
4.1.4. The promotion of badame
Local legal systemsaimtopromotebadame (literally, ‘forgiveness’ or ‘reconciliation’)
between the parties so that the tension is alleviated and the conﬂict is less likely
to continue in the future. Once the decision is made, the sentence is put to the
offender, who then enters a dialoguewith the victim as to whether it is appropriate.
Agreementmust be reachedbetweenbothparties andduring this process themeans
of each party is considered.101
4.2. The drawbacks of using the local systems of law
As well as the many beneﬁts of the local legal systems there are also a number of
drawbacks.
4.2.1. Inconsistency of outcomes, openness to abuse, and enforcement problems
The outcomes are inconsistent because the laws applied are unwritten, they vary
betweenregionsandare ‘subject to thedifferentpersonalities involvedandtheirown
96. Hohe and Nixon, supra note 45, at 64.
97. Mearns, supra note 7, at 50.
98. Hohe and Nixon, supra note 45, at 65.
99. Swaine, supra note 81, at 2. Swaine states that the right to appeal does exist in some form but that women
are reluctant to use it for fear of retribution by local law-holders (at 2). Furthermore, she questions the
transparency of these appeal systems (at 33).
100. Mearns, supra note 7, at 44.
101. See the transcript of the address by President Xanana Gusma˜o to the ‘International Conference on Tra-
ditional Conﬂict Resolution and Traditional Justice’ in Timor Leste, Dili, 27 June 2003, available at
http://www.asiafoundation.org/Locations/easttimor_gusmao.html.
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interpretations of how justice should be administered’.102 This presents a problem
for establishing the rule of lawwhich requires a degree of consistency and certainty.
The unwritten and arbitrary nature of local laws lacks transparency and allows
wide scope for the potential for bias, bribery,103 and other abuses.104 Given the lack
of regulation and supervision of such bodies, there are no safeguards protecting
against such abuses.
In addition, local legal systemshave few tools to enforce decisions. This is demon-
strated most clearly in cases of domestic violence where an agreement is reached
between the parties that the perpetratorwill compensate the victim’s family but the
perpetrator fails to do so.105
4.2.2. Practices falling below international human rights standards
Themain opposition to the use of local legal systems derives from the concern that
some of its practices are below international human rights standards, in particular
with regard to their impact on women’s rights. This issue is elaborated on below.
The counter-argument is to the effect that these standards are not culturally
relevant or applicable to East Timorese people. Resistance to the imposition of these
standards has dismissed them as a ‘new form of colonialism’ imposed by the UN.
SomeUNvalues areperceivedas alienand remote to theEastTimoresevalue system.
For example, one local lawyer stated of UNTAET,
The UN have a mandate to provide stability, but they should not just impose these
human rights laws from New York and Geneva. People felt strange having these laws
imposed. TheUN should have consultedwith the communities to ask the leaderswhat
ideas they had about implementing UN laws.106
This stereotypical understanding of the UN’s intervention underlines the im-
portance of ensuring that communication channels with the local population are
effectively set up tohighlight the signiﬁcant commonalities sharedby international
human rights law and local law.
4.2.3. Disadvantages for women
Themaindisadvantagesarising fromthe local legal systemforwomenareas follows.
Participation. As users, women’s level of participation in local legal systems is
‘minimal and often superﬁcial’.107 Many local belief systems hold that women do
102. Swaine, supra note 81, at 19.
103. Xanana Gusma˜o states that ‘bonuses are a reality and the balance of justice may weigh in favour of those
who paymore . . .Once the problem is resolved, it is also common for the winning party to give a monetary
reward to the agents of justice’. Supra note 101.
104. The system may also be open to abuse by some participants. According to Swaine, barlaque (bride price) is
sometimes argued by husbands in family disputes as a justiﬁcation for their actions and as a reasonwhy the
wife’s family should not be involved in the hearing. Supra note 81, at 60.
105. Aisling Swaine comments that ‘Local justice has little power to enforce its ruling,whether that is in regard to
the compensation payment or the prevention of further violence. Men are not forced to take responsibility
for their violent acts.’ Supra note 81, at 2. Swaine quotes the comments of a local Ainaro woman: ‘I don’t
like Adat because up until this time he [her husband] was beating me and it didn’t stop until the police got
involved’: at 62.
106. Quoted by Hohe and Nixon, supra note 45, at 57. See also Mearns, supra note 7, at 50.
107. Swaine, supra note 81, at 2.
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not possess, and never have possessed, power in the local sphere to be decision
makers.108 These common local beliefs curtail the possibility of women’s equal
participation in local legal systems as both participants and holders of the law.
Compensation and other problems relating to gender-based crimes. The approach of
East Timorese local law to sexual crimes and gender-based crimes does not meet
international standards in a number of ways. First, the crime of rape is not fully
conceptualized. There is little distinction between rape and adultery. Moreover,
local legal systems often require the perpetrator to marry the victim or to pay
compensation. The case of a man reneging on his promise to marry a woman after
consensual sexual intercourse is considered by local authorities to be more serious
than that of a violent rape.109 Local belief systems hold that such offences are a
disturbance to the ﬂow of values which thus need to be restored through the act
of compensation. For example, when victims of rape and domestic violence take
their case to their local legal systems, a form of compensation might be agreed
on. The problem is that this compensation is made to the family of the woman
and not to the victim herself. As Hohe and Nixon comment, ‘the compensation
negotiations associated with the resolution of rape (and adultery) cases make the
crime itself appear like a property offence and women appear as cattle’.110 With
regard to domestic violence, compensation paid by a husband is also problematic,
since it effectively penalizes the woman, whose economic means, based on her
husband’s, are thereby decreased.
Bias against women. Women face bias in engaging with local law. Swaine states
that awoman ‘whopresents a complaint of violence to a local justice hearing cannot
be guaranteed that “justice” in the true sense of the word will be delivered’.111 Local
biases and cultural beliefs regarding women’s status in society often inform rulings
at the local level. For example, the local legal systems are seen ‘to often blame
women for the cases of [domestic] violence presented’.112 Generally women victims
and offenders feel that their needs and input into the process are ignored.113
These drawbacks of local law are serious in that they imperil the establishment
of the rule of law in East Timor. The next question relates to the status given to local
law by East Timor’s Constitution114 and the position it confers on the rule of law.
108. Ibid. At 25–6 Swaine relates a discussion on this question with a council of elders in Cora Lima. This
fascinating discussion reveals that the justiﬁcations used to excludewomen from the realmof legal decision
making include the views that the ancestors have decreed that only men can ‘know’ and ‘speak’ the ‘words
of law’, that it is a cultural matter, and further, that women are not educated and are therefore unreliable.
109. Hohe and Nixon, supra note 45, at 60. See also Swaine, supra note 81, at 47.
110. Hohe and Nixon, supra note 45, at 61.
111. Swaine, supra note 81, at 2.
112. Ibid., at 4. For examples, see ibid., at 27–33. Swaine states: ‘The systemsare inherentlybiased towardswomen’s
status, decision-making capabilities and their roles within their communities.’ Ibid., at 3.
113. Interview with Manuela Leong Pereira, the Director of Fokupers, Dili, 17 June 2005. The potential for
bias also lies in the fact that most disputes are dealt with initially in the family sphere. Of such a forum
for dispute resolution, Nyamu-Musembi explains that ‘embedded ideas about authority and gender roles
seem to constrain open deliberation on the facts, and to dictate a resort to idealised statements of custom
that necessitate a particular outcome’. See C. Nyamu-Musembi, ‘Are Local Norms and Practices Fences or
Pathways?TheExampleofWomen’sPropertyRights’, inA.An-Na’im(ed.)CulturalTransformationandHuman
Rights in Africa (2002), at 139.
114. The path of constitutional recognition of local ‘customary’ law has been chosen not only by many African
countries, including South Africa, but also by most Paciﬁc Island states. While some have chosen to assign
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5. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF LOCAL LAW
Article2(4)ofEastTimor’sConstitution115 provides somerecognitionof localnorms
and customs:116
4. The State shall recognize and value thenorms and customsof East Timor that are not
contrary to theConstitution and to any legislation dealing speciﬁcallywith customary
law.
This subsection gives recognition to local norms and customs; arguably it intends
to direct the courts (presumably ‘the State’ includes state courts) to have regard to
local ‘customary’ law. But the subsection is ambiguous in that it does not appear to
go so far as to specify that courts are to apply them as being part of the body of East
Timor’s formal law. In theabsenceof a less ambiguousconstitutionalprovision, such
as that in South Africa’s Constitution,117 East Timor’s government needs to enact
legislation clarifying the relationship between the two systems of law and setting
out some judicial guidelines so as to remedy the present confusion in East Timor’s
courts as to whether and when local law can be used. For example, the courts have
been grappling in an ad hoc fashion with the questions as to whether local law can
be legitimately used as a criminal law defence, as a ground for dismissing a case, to
mitigate a sentence, or in sentencing generally.118
customary law a rank in the hierarchy of laws, others have left this question somewhat vague. The Tongan
Constitution of 1875 makes no express mention of custom, but in all other Paciﬁc states the written law
expressly provides for customary law to be used in relation to land disputes. In the Solomon Islands, Samoa,
Tuvalu,Kiribati, Nauru, andVanuatu,written lawprovides for the broader applicationof customary law. See,
e.g., the Constitution of the Solomon Islands, S. 76 and sched. 3, para. 3(1), which states that ‘subject to this
paragraph, customary law shall have effect as part of the law of Solomon Islands’. Para. 3(2) states that para.
3(1) ‘shall not apply in respect of any customary law that is, and to the extent that it is, inconsistent with
the Constitution or an Act of Parliament’. Art. III(1) of the Constitution of Samoa 1962 provides: ‘Law . . .
includes any custom or usage which has acquired the force of law in Samoa . . .under the provisions of any
Act or under a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.’ See J. C. Care et al., Introduction to South Paciﬁc
Law (1999), ch. 3.
115. This Constitution came into force on 20May 2002.
116. There is another provision which points to the possibility of a formal engagement between local legal
systems and the formal legal system:
Article 123 Categories of courts
1. There shall be the following categories of courts in the Democratic Republic of East Timor:
a) The Supreme Court of Justice and other courts of law;
b) The High Administrative, Tax and Audit Court and other administrative courts of ﬁrst instance;
c) Military Courts.
. . .
5. The lawmay institutionalise means and ways for the non-jurisdictional resolution of disputes.
Para. 5 sits strangely in this section; one interpretation is that it is an opening to allow a formal engagement
with local systemsof dispute resolutionwhich are clearly beyond thepresent jurisdictionof the formal court
system.
117. S. 211(3) of South Africa’s 1996 Constitution provides: ‘The courtsmust apply customary lawwhen that law
is applicable, subject to theConstitution and any legislation that speciﬁcally dealswith customary law.’ This
recognition is reiterated in S. 39 of the constitution which deals with the interpretation of the Bill of Rights.
Subsection 3 provides: ‘The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are
recognized or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent
with the Bill.’
118. These cases have been reported by the JSMP – see the following reports: ‘The Role, Practice and Procedure of
the Court of Appeal’, 28 June 2005, at 15; ‘Judge Applies Customary Law in a Criminal Case’, press release,
19 May 2005; supra note 20, at 14–15.
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According to Article 2(4) of East Timor’s Constitution, local norms and customs
must ‘not [be] contrary to the Constitution’. This means that they are subject to
the extensive bill of rights entrenched in East Timor’s Constitution,119 as well as
to international conventions, such as core human rights treaties, which are given
special status by Article 9(3) of the Constitution:
3. All rules that are contrary to the provisions of international conventions, treaties
and agreements applied in the internal legal system of East Timor shall be invalid.
East Timor has acceded to a number of international conventions. For example,
in 2003, a year after independence, it acceded to almost all the coreUNhuman rights
conventions: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the
InternationalCovenantonEconomic, Social andCulturalRights, theConventionon
the Elimination ofDiscrimination againstWomen, theConvention against Torture,
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.120 Article 9(2) provides that the act
of accession to an international treaty transforms it into state law:
2. Rules provided for in international conventions, treaties and agreements shall apply
in the internal legal system of East Timor following their approval, ratiﬁcation or
accession by the respective competent organs and after publication in the ofﬁcial
gazette.
This means that local law would need to be consistent with the above inter-
national human rights conventions. More generally, the ‘objectives of the state’ are
outlined in Article 6. One of these objectives is:
(b) To guarantee and promote the fundamental rights and freedoms of the citizens and
the respect for the principles of the democratic state based on the rule of law. (emphasis
added)
The rule of law is not deﬁned in the Constitution, although some of the elements
of the Secretary-General’s deﬁnition can be made out. For example, Articles 119–
22 guarantee the independence of the judiciary and the courts’ duty to uphold
the Constitution and its principles, while Article 69 guarantees the separation of
powers. Furthermore, the Constitution explicitly protects fundamental values such
as equality and gives the judiciary guardianship over these values.
To sum up, East Timor’s Constitution has not given local law a formal position
in the state legal system. Some form of explicit legislative recognition is necessary
119. East Timor’s Constitution has special sections regarding the rights of women, children, youth, the elderly,
disabled citizens and the diaspora (Arts. 17–22). It guarantees an extensive list of civil and political rights
(Arts. 29–49) and social, economic, and cultural rights and duties (Arts. 50–61). Note, however, that the
enforcement provisions for these rights are not particularly strong. Under Art. 27, the independent ofﬁce
of the Ombudsman only has the power ‘to examine and seek to settle citizens’ complaints against public
bodies, certify the conformity of the acts with the law, prevent and initiate the process to remedy injustices’.
120. Except for the ICCPR, supranote 16, accession to these international treaties took place on 16April 2003. The
ICCPRwas acceded to on18 Sept. 2003. East Timorhas not acceded to theUNConventionon theElimination
of Racial Discrimination, supranote 16.However, it has acceded to the 1991 International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All MigrantWorkers, supra note 16, to the 1989 Second Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant onCivil and Political Rights, (1990) 29 ILM1464 (18 Sept. 2003), to the twoOptional
Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. A/RES/54/263 (2000) (25 May 2000 and
16 April 2003 respectively) and to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination againstWomen, UNDoc. A/54/4 (1999) (16 April 2003).
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in order to give the courts clearer guidelines as to the legitimate use of local law.
However, if local law were to be given recognition, it would need to be compatible
withEastTimor’sconstitutionallyentrenchedbillof rights, the internationalhuman
rights treaties that have been acceded to and East Timor’s constitutional objectives
based on the rule of law.
6. THE FUTURE ROLE OF LOCAL LEGAL SYSTEMS
The current unrecognized position of local law is clearly the source of many of the
drawbacks of local law, such as thedegree of potential bias, because this lawoperates
without a sufﬁciently strong systemof checks. Arguably, however, the advantages of
engagingwith local legal systemsoutweigh theproblems inusing local law, because
without this engagement state law risks losing relevance and legitimacy in the eyes
of the local population. The question is whether ofﬁcial recognition of local law –
classic legal pluralism – can remedy local law’s drawbacks. In this section Imap out
the views of some local experts and government ﬁgures, followed by various views
from some ‘outside’ experts who have conducted studies into this question.
6.1. Some local views
6.1.1. Public opinions
Generally, local law in some form appears to garner popular support in East Timor.
Interviews with locals conducted by Swaine in three districts in East Timor on the
question of the status of local law produced heated discussion, with all participants
asserting that ‘if local justice was abolished as a method for resolving community
disputes, they would lose a way of life and culture – and would have nothing to
pass on to future generations’.121 The female participants shared this view, but also
expressed strong support for a combination of the two systems.122 Local impetus
clearly exists for local law to be harnessed by state law in some form so as to give
the local population some feeling of ownership over, and connection with, the
applicable law and its values. This is seen in the following comment made by an
East Timorese lawyer:
If people are to own the law, even in a transitional context, then they must feel that
it recognizes their own customs. It makes sense to put customary law together with
state law . . .UNTAET adopted Indonesian laws and this did not come from the people.
It was top down.123
The question of how practically to ‘put customary law together with state law’ is
the real issue.
Some local activists and women’s groups have been involved in organizing local
education campaigns in the villages on issues such as rape, domestic violence, and
marriage.124 Their efforts lie in calling for speciﬁc changes andmodiﬁcations to local
121. Swaine, supra note 81, at 63–4.
122. Ibid.
123. Hohe and Nixon, supra note 45, at 57.
124. Ibid., at 61, where they are describing the work of Centro Feto (Centre forWomen).
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law to reﬂect changing values concerning gender roles in society. For example, some
groups advocate ‘compensation paid in relation to sexual crimes, domestic violence
or other offences to be paid directly to the victims instead of to the families’.125
These actionsmake it clear that somewomen’s groups do not regard formal law as a
panacea; instead they consider amodiﬁed formof local law as an ongoing and viable
means of community dispute resolution.
Another important local initiative to modify local law, spearheaded by the Peace
and Democracy Foundation, has been the establishing of a mediationmodel, ‘based
on the existing culture’ of East Timor, for civil cases, a sphereneglectedby the formal
system.126 Given that East Timor has many models of dispute resolution, the idea
is that the mediation model could become the ‘one common model to be used in
all communities’.127 The aim of the proposed model is to improve local dispute
resolution and ‘correct the problemswith the customary practice’ by implementing
an alternativemechanism that is ‘more transparent’ and ‘can reduce discrimination’
suffered bywomen and young people in the local legal sphere.128 Themodel prefers
mediation to the system of arbitration most commonly used at the local level
because it allows the parties to the conﬂict to ﬁnd a solution to their problem
with the assistance of a mediation team made up of customary leaders, as well as
representatives of women, youth, and religion.
This model, currently at its pilot stage, has the potential to complement formal
law in civil matters, thereby reducing the pressure on district courts.129 The merit
of the model is that it seeks to integrate mediation principles with the positive
aspects of local customary dispute resolution, so that local leaders will continue to
be involved in the process of resolving local disputes but will no longer have the
power to decide thematter. The ever evolving nature of local law suggests that these
principles of mediation and broader representation could be accommodated into
the local system as long as there is sufﬁcient local will. If this will were found, the
next step would be for the government to recognize the system formally through
legislation.130
6.1.2. The government’s views
Some elements in the government appear to be uninterested in the potential of
using local law.131 This viewdoes not appear to be shared byEast Timorese President
125. Ibid.
126. Peace and Democracy Foundation, ‘Report about Research on Customary Dispute Resolution and Proposed
MediationModel for the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste’, November 2004, at 69 (document on ﬁle with
author).
127. Ibid., at 9.
128. Ibid., at 5.
129. Interview with Peace and Democracy Foundation, Dili, 14 June, 2005. The mediation process has also been
favoured to resolve disputes concerning land issues and for less serious crimes by East Timor’s Truth,
Reception and Reconciliation Commission. For a discussion of some ‘grassroots strategies’ which use local
mechanismstoachievereconciliation, seeD.Babo-Soares, ‘NaheBiti:ThePhilosophyandProcessofGrassroots
Reconciliation (and Justice) in East Timor’, (2004) 5Asia Paciﬁc Journal of Anthropology 15.
130. Thiswouldbenecessary inorder topromote legitimacyof theprocessandtoensurestandardsof transparency
and accountability: Peace and Democracy Foundation, supra note 126, at 7.
131. Hohe andNixon state somewhat vaguely that due to some social and historical factors, ‘some factions of the
governmental party are condemning all efforts to integrate local concepts of justice’, supra note 45, at 67.
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Xanana Gusma˜o, who, speaking at a conference on traditional justice in Dili in
June 2003, outlined in a neutral fashion both the positive and negative aspects of
local systemsof justice.His speechunderlined theneed to reform the current system
of legal pluralism by bringing in greater transparency. He argued that
For traditional justice to gain greater credibility it is necessary to reorganize its com-
ponents; this will enable these ‘courts’ to truly serve the communities and continue to
be open and accessible to the general public at a greater level.132
In his view there is a ‘crying need to establish the judicial system based on the
sucos (villages) so that local government bodies, including the police,may intervene
and avoid disputes within the community’.133 However, he seems uncertain as to
how state legislation can bring about an engagement between the two systems, as
he sees an ‘enormous gap, which is often difﬁcult to bridge, between drafting the
law and the still traditional perception of the majority of the population’.134
6.2. Some outsider views
Mearns advocates that East Timor build on its vibrant local legal systems rather than
eliminate them in the name of progress.135 He believes that a process of formally
incorporating local systems will allow monitoring so that these systems become
better sources of stability and means of maintaining the peace.136 He asserts, ‘The
future lies in a coalition rather than a confrontation between existing village-based
systems and the new law of an independent Timor Loro Sa’e [the Tetum version of
Timor-Leste]’.137 The word ‘coalition’ maymean that the local system could remain
a separate entity within this formal system, operating complementarily in parallel
with the national system.
Two other experts, Tanje Hohe, a political scientist, and Rod Nixon, an anthropo-
logist, argue that a parallel system will not be beneﬁcial to East Timor. They assert
that it will not work, as having ‘two different ways of doing things is unlikely to
promote social stability’ and stability is essential for a post-conﬂict society such as
East Timor. Instead, they recommend that ‘some features of customary law should
be integrated into written law’, and theymake some speciﬁc suggestions.138
Possibly they are referring to those government ministers who were part of the diaspora of East Timorese
in exile in countries such as Portugal, Australia, and Mozambique and who are perceived by some as being
removed from, and hence uninterested in, the local order and its positive aspects. One of those ostensibly
not in this group is the Foreign Affairs Minister, Jose Ramos Horta, who has thrown his support behind the
Peace and Democracy Foundation’s mediationmodel.
132. Gusma˜o, supra note 101.
133. Ibid.
134. Ibid.
135. Mearns, supra note 7, at 55.
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid. (emphasis added).
138. Hohe and Nixon, supra note 45, at 68 (emphasis added). They appear to be advocating a ‘selective interference
principle’ which focuses on a limited range of modiﬁcations to local practices. For example, they argue that
the formal justice systemshouldbeusedonly for serious crimes. In their view, only this ‘integrated’ approach
can realistically meet with success given East Timor’s currently limited resources and capacity. They state
that ‘only those features of the local system that contradict international standards of human rights should
be abolished’, as above.
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Swaine’s report for the International Rescue Committee examines the current
parallel relationship between the two systems and notes that it is presently ‘quite
strained’, because both systems are failing adequately to deal with certain issues
such as gender-based violence.139 In her view, the parallel system ‘has caused much
confusion forwomenuserswhoare caught in the interfacebetween the two systems
and for the administrators of local justice and police themselves who are not sure
wherethe linebetweenthetwoprocesses is’.140Wherecomplainantshavethechoice
of two different systems and they take a matter to one system, the problem is that
that system refers thematter to the other system, thus confusing complainants and
failing to meet their needs. However, Swaine acknowledges that at times the two
systems can operate usefully side by side. For example, she observes, ‘A combination
of the two systems were seen [by domestic violence victims] to be most forceful’;
while ‘Police were seen to have more force and capacity to scare husbands into
stopping their actions’, the local system has the ‘advantage of cultural and accepted
methods of dealing with problems’.141 This ensures that ‘processes were fair and
delivered what they wanted – justice for the act of violence and for that violence
to stop’.142 Thus a parallel system can assist women in accessing justice in some
circumstances.
Swaine advocates a ‘formal engagement’ between the two systems. She believes
that the local legal authorities are ‘open to and desire a formalization of the rela-
tionship between the two systems so that local justice can become more forceful
and respected by community members’.143 The advantage of a formal engagement
is that it would enable ‘the debilitating cultural practices within local justice to be
addressed and changes which need to take place facilitated in a way that is inclus-
ive and supportive of all stakeholders’.144 But she warns, like Gusma˜o, that these
changes may be complex and take a long time.
There is some opposition to the use of local law by some outside human rights
workers who argue for its abolition, citing the drawbacks identiﬁed above. Oppon-
ents argue that ofﬁcial state entities such as the police should not be involved with
local legal systems in anymanner, as thiswill legitimate these systems and condone
their practices which conﬂict with international human rights standards.145
7. FUTURE PATHS
Thegeneralconsensus is that thecurrentstateof legalpluralismisnotworkingas it is
placing strain on both systems and causing confusion for locals. There is agreement
on the need to ‘put customary law together with state law’, as well as on the view
139. Swaine, supra note 81, at 4.
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid. See also Hohe and Nixon, supra note 45, at 50.
143. Swaine, supra note 81, at 4.
144. Ibid.
145. These arguments are raised inotherparts of theworldwhere there is discussionof engagingwith ‘traditional’
or ‘customary’ law. For example, the South African Rural Women’s Movement and South African National
Civics Organisation (Sanco) both oppose such engagement with local law.
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that local law requires some modiﬁcations. Exactly how these processes should
be carried out is controversial. The reports of the outside experts appear to align
themselves with two different paths for state law pluralism. One is an integrated
system whereby substantive local law and state law are uniﬁed into a single legal
code.146 The alternative path is for parallel systems to continue to operate but on
a formal basis, linked at the apex through a single integrated appeal court.147 Both
paths pose various challenges.
7.1. Path 1: an integrated system
Hohe and Nixon’s argument for a partly integrated system is at ﬁrst impression
a persuasive one, since it seems to promise a neat solution of a predominantly
single, uniﬁed law and centres on the need for stability in an unstable transitional
state. It advocates the integration of some local law into written law, which would
presumably involve a degree of codiﬁcation. The beneﬁts of codiﬁcation lie in the
fact that it ensures greater certainty and consistency, important elements of the rule
of law.
However, the experience of other states that have attempted such integration
points to this being a challenging and also potentially dangerous path. First, it
would be an expensive and time-consuming anthropological task to collate the
diverse local laws, to translate them into written form and to identify and distil
sufﬁcientcommonstrandsandprinciplesamongthem.Second,potentialdanger lies
in the fact that the act ofwriting down customary lawmay lead to distortion. This is
illustrated by a recent case in the SouthAfricanConstitutional Court,Bhe andOthers
v. The Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others,148 where the court held that customary
law in South Africa has been ‘distorted’ by its codiﬁcation in legislation. The case
concernedtheconstitutionalityof thecustomaryruleofmaleprimogeniturewritten
into the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927. Writing for the majority, Langa DCJ
articulated some of the problems produced by codiﬁcation:
The rules of succession in customary law have not been given the space to adapt and
to keep pacewith changing social conditions and values. One reason for this is the fact
that they were captured in legislation, in textbooks, in the writings of experts and in
court decisions without allowing for the dynamism of customary law in the face of
changing circumstances. Instead, they have over time become increasingly out of step
with the real values and circumstances of the societies they are meant to serve and
particularly the people who live in urban areas.149
Of particular concern has been the fact that this distortion in the South African
context has emphasized the patriarchal features of African customary laws and
minimized their communitarian features.150
146. This path has been followed in African states such as Ghana and Senegal.
147. This took place in Chad, the Central African Republic, and Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo).
148. CCT 49/03 (15 Oct. 2004).
149. Ibid., para. 83. The judgment goes on to assert that there is a distinction between ‘living customary law’
and ‘ofﬁcial customary law’ and that ‘ofﬁcial customary law as it exists in the textbooks and in the Act is
generally a poor reﬂection, if not a distortion, of the true customary law’: paras. 86–7.
150. Ibid., para. 89.
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If such a codiﬁcation project were undertaken in East Timor, it is important
that in the pre-codiﬁcation stages such law be scrutinized so as to ensure that only
customary law that is consistent with human rights standards is recognized. Other-
wise gender inequalities extant in local law will become deepened and ingrained.
While statute law is obviously anything but exempt from amendment, the written
articulation of local legal practices will have the effect of placing the initial code as
the original reﬂection of local norms, thus freezing and ossifying them in theminds
of the local population. This would rob customary law of itsmost positive attribute:
its dynamic ability to evolve and to recognize changes taking place.
7.2. Path 2: a dual system
It is possible that Mearns’s suggestion of a dual system is the more sound option
for a number of reasons.151 First, this option would preserve the dynamic nature of
local law. Second, it could complement state district courts by relieving congestion
in state courts and easing the burden on defendants, complainants, and witnesses
of travelling long distances to the nearest district court. There is the danger, of
course, that it can lead to the perception that one system is inferior to the other.
One commentator, Brown, states generally that ‘customary law is not equipped to
compete with the monolithic strength of introduced law systems and will be the
inevitable loser inanycircumstanceswherethere isachoicebetweenthesystems’.152
This analysis does not appear to ﬁt transitional countries such as East Timor, where
the state legal system collapsed after the ballot and is hence relatively weak in
contrast to local ‘customary’ law. In these transitional situations the relationship
between the systems has greater potential to be complementary and symbiotic.
On the structural issues involved in a dual system, South Africa’s contemporary
experience is a useful starting point. South Africa’s parliament is currently in the
process of debating a bill on customary courts which would formally recognize
and establish a hierarchy of customary courts, from a ‘headman’s court’ to a ‘chief’s
court’. As in East Timor, dispute resolution in rural South Africa generally starts
at the family level and if a resolution is not found, the dispute will be taken to
a ‘headman’s court’ to be resolved. Through recognition of the headman’s court,
the bill proposes to recognize local dispute resolution. The bill also proposes the
appointment of a registrar to supervise and guide the customary court system as
well as a right to appeal either to a higher customary court or to the state court
system. Litigants are permitted to opt out of the jurisdiction of customary courts,
even after proceedings have begun. A monetary cap has been recommended for all
matters in customary courts.
151. For an argument against dual systems see K. Brown, ‘Customary Law in the Paciﬁc: An Endangered Species?’,
(1999) 3 Journal of South Paciﬁc Law. Brown argues that those who advocate dual systems have a conservative
agenda, andhe asserts that the consequence of such a systemcanbe a formof legal apartheid. It is undeniable
that in the past dual systems were set up by colonial administrators with conservative agendas so as to
impose control through indirect rule. Possibly this consequence is more likely in a state with separate racial
or ethnic groups as in South Africa. In East Timor the worst outcomewould be a division between the rural
and urban populations. Note that Brown’s article is useful in giving an insight into some of the problems
encountered by customary lawwhen two systems are integrated into a uniﬁed system.
152. Ibid.
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7.2.1. Supervision and conformity with constitutional principles
The effect of formally bringing local ‘courts’ into state supervision is that theymust
operate in conformity with state law, both constitutional law and legislation. In
this sense the extensive bill of rights entrenched in East Timor’s Constitution is
relevant.153 For example, Article 16 protects against discrimination and guarantees
equality before the law, while Article 17 provides that men and women have equal
rights and duties. Furthermore, democracy and the rule of law are emphasized in
the Constitution as two of its ‘fundamental principles’.154 Local ‘courts’ would need
to promote these values. The courts’ role would also be to balance the competing
claims of constitutionally entrenched international human rights norms and the
preservation of local norms and customs that are connected with local cultural
identity and also protected in the Constitution.155
It would be the duty of an ofﬁcial, akin to the South African model’s registrar,
to ensure the promotion of constitutional values by local ‘courts’ as well as, more
generally, the consistency of court outcomes from region to region. The Peace and
Democracy Foundation’s proposed local mediation model includes an element of
supervision, as it requires that all agreements be signed by the parties and can
be registered with the district court. In addition, the suco chief must prepare a
monthly report of all matters mediated. Parties have the option of taking their
matter from the course of mediation to the courts. Of course, where particular
customs are clearly inconsistent with constitutional values, the legislature should
taketheresponsibilityformodifyingorabolishingthesecustomsthroughlegislation
after local consultation, rather than leave them to be appealed through the court
systems. TheOfﬁce of theOmbudsman forHumanRights and Justice (‘Provedor’)156
could assist the parliament in this function by setting out which local laws are
plainly inconsistent with East Timor’s human rights obligations.
7.2.2. Composition
Thecompositionof local ‘courts’ inadual legalsystemisanimportant issue.Thispro-
cess must be driven by the constitutional values of democracy, non-discrimination,
and equality. The deﬁnition of the rule of law offered by the UN Secretary-General
includes consideration of ‘participation in decision making’, which can be read
to encompass legal decision-making. The composition of ‘courts’ needs to be
153. See supra note 119.
154. For example, Art. 1 states that the Democratic Republic of East Timor is a ‘democratic . . . State based on the
rule of law . . . and the respect for the dignity of the human person’.
155. S. 59 (5) of the Constitution provides: ‘Everyone has the right to cultural enjoyment and creativity, and the
duty topreserve,protectandvalueculturalheritage.’Note that s. 23 states that ‘Fundamental rightsenshrined
in the constitution . . . shall be interpreted in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’
For an example of how the South African Constitutional Court has balanced such rights, see Bhe and Others
v. The Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others, supra note 148, which held to be unconstitutional the rule of male
primogeniture as it applies in African customary law as well as s. 23 of the Black Administration Act 1927.
The rule violated ss. 9(3) (right to equality) and 10 (dignity) of the Constitution. Note, however, that some
countries have constitutions which allow customary law to override anti-discrimination provisions. See,
e.g., the Constitution of Fiji Islands, s. 38(8)–(10); theConstitution of Tuvalu, s. 27(3)(d); and theConstitution
of Solomon Islands, s. 15(c).
156. Art. 27 of the Constitution sets out the role of the Ombudsman. LawNo 7/2004, Art. 28, sets out the scope of
the Ombudsman’s powers.
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representative of the community as a whole, and thus women need to be included
in the process. East Timor’s 2004 Law on Election of Suco Chiefs and Suco Councils
reserves aminimumof three seats for women on each suco council,157 a bodywhich
is expected to ‘solve’ ‘speciﬁcproblems’ in the community.158 Thepossible precursor
to this was the Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project (CEP), an
UNTAET programme set up in 2000, which went further by establishing village
councils composed of an equal number of men and women democratically elected
for the purpose of disbursing funds for local development.159 Unlike CEP, however,
it is unlikely that women will make up half of the membership of a suco council
because apart from the suco chief, a male youth, and an ‘elder’, the remaining seats
on the council are to be taken up by the chiefs of all villages making up the suco,
who are generally male and on average number about six per suco.160
The challenge here is ensuring that law propels cultural change and making
women’s membership count. There are a number of hurdles. First, local chiefs may
oppose women’s participation in local ‘courts’, as many local belief systems in East
Timorhold thatwomendonotpossessdecision-makingpower in the local sphere.161
OspinaandHohestate, ‘Traditionally, inEastTimorese societies thedecision-making
process is the domain of the senior male of the existing social groups within the
hamlets. Rural women are not supposed to be outspoken and to take the ﬂoor in
publicmeetings.’162 They relate the experiences of theCEP,wherewomen’s particip-
ation and contribution was limited despite their making up half the membership.
In their analysis, women were preventing from taking a more active role due to
structural constraints – ‘the demands of their traditional role in society’ as well as
‘the lack of transportation and training’.163 They observed that female members of
the council ‘seemed to be sidelined . . . in interviews with male council members
they would not make any comments, unless directly asked’.164
Despite thishurdle, a representative council that assists the chief in local decision
makingispreferable tothepathchosenbysomePaciﬁcIslandsstatessuchasWestern
Samoa, where statute law has conﬁrmed the traditional authority of village chiefs
157. S. 3. See also Reg. No. 182/STAE/2004 passed under Art. 12.6 of Law 2/2004. This is similar to some of the
options proposed in South Africa’s Customary Courts Bill (s. 4), but it appears that a policy decision on
this thorny issue has not yet been taken: see South African Law Commission, ‘Customary Law: Report on
Traditional Courts and the Judicial Function of Traditional Leaders’, 21 Jan. 2003, ch. 2.
158. See the preamble to Law No. 2/2004. Note that the Law does not specify the nature and scope of these
‘problems’.
159. The aim of this programmewas to build the foundations of democracy at the local level. See S. Ospina and T.
Hohe, ‘Traditional Power Structures and Local Governance in East Timor: A Case Study of the Community
Empowerment Project’, Graduate Institute of Development Studies, Geneva, December 2002.
160. On average, each suco is made up of about six villages. However, one suco in Dili has 32 villages. According
to the Peace and Democracy Foundation, fewer than 2 per cent of traditional leaders are women: supra note
126, at 9.
161. Ospina and Hohe, supra note 159, at 112.
162. Ibid.
163. Ibid.
164. Ibid., at 110. See also the experience of the female commissioners and panel members involved in the
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation: JSMP, ‘Unfulﬁlled Expectations: Community Views
on CAVR’s Community Reconciliation Process’, August 2004. The report states that community members
raised few concerns regarding women’s participation as panel members and commissioners. While local
leaders were initially sceptical about women’s role in conﬂict resolution, the report states that acceptance
of this role grew over time. Ibid., at 37–8.
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and matais (chieﬂy heads of families) to exercise local ‘customary’ law without
incorporating any element of representativeness.165 The path taken by Western
Samoa operates to engrain patriarchal values by reinforcing the status quo. The
problem is articulated by a group of Fijian women thus: ‘tradition, culture and
customin themain isdeﬁnedbymen,notwomen–therefore there is a conﬂict about
whose custom is being applied, especially given that custom is largelyunwritten’.166
A representative council may avoid this particular problem as long as decisions are
taken collectively by consensus or majority vote. Women’s participation, however
minimal, will allow for some contestation of patriarchal norms in local law, while
in the long term it may make women’s authority more acceptable and legitimate
and give womenmore skills and conﬁdence for the future.167
Second, local belief systems variously hold that appointment to primary posi-
tions of lawmaking is only by descent.168 The hierarchically ordered nature of East
Timoresesocietymeansthatdemocracyisnotafamiliarnorm.Itwill takemanyyears
andmanifold programmes for such international norms to become adapted into the
local cosmic order by the East Timorese, particularly those living in rural areas.169
7.2.3. Jurisdiction
Thedualoptionpresents thequestionof jurisdiction. Jurisdictionshouldbebasedon
criteriasuchasresidenceandproximityaswellas thenatureof theoffence.Generally
the criminal jurisdiction of local decision-making bodies in East Timor should be
limited to deal withminor offences.170 The question of jurisdiction is fraught when
it comes todomestic violence,171 themostprevalent crime inEastTimor, accounting
165. Village Fono Act 1990.
166. Submission by the Fiji Women’s Rights Movement and Crisis Centre: Report of the Commission of Inquiry
on the Courts (Fiji 1994) (Beattie Commission), at 172, as quoted in J. C. Care, ‘Conﬂict between Customary
Law and Human Rights in the South Paciﬁc’, (1999) 1 Commonwealth Law Conference Papers, Kuala Lumpur
251.
167. See Nyamu-Musembi, supra note 113, at 141–3.
168. East Timorese society is based on a hierarchy of ‘houses’ in which every house has a position depending on
when a family settled in the territory. ‘Through a House’s speciﬁc position in the cosmos, speciﬁc tasks are
given to it. These include all important ritual and political activities’. Ospina andHohe, supranote 159, at 23,
36, and generally. On the belief regarding the appointment of village chiefs, for example, Ospina and Hohe
state (at 36):
Only the ritual authorities have the knowledge about the descent line and oaths that were taken in the past,
hence they have the capacity to choose a political ruler that is also sanctioned by the ancestors. People are
often scared if a ruler does not conform to this system, as this canmeanmisfortune for thewhole community
caused by angry ancestral powers.
169. According toOspina andHohe, ‘Themajority of the population at the local level perceive that power holders
have to descend from the family sanctioned by the supernatural power of the ancestors. Therefore, the idea
of a local democratically elected “development agency” [such as CEP] with decision-making authority has
not yet fully taken root.’ Supra note 159, at 116.
170. Note that not all customary courts in countries with dual legal systems have criminal jurisdiction. For
example, customary courts in Zimbabwe have no criminal jurisdiction and South African customary courts
have limited criminal jurisdiction, while in Botswana and Swaziland they have broad criminal jurisdiction.
171. It appears that this matter has also not been considered in South Africa until recently. Its bill leaves rape
within the exclusive jurisdiction of non-customary courts alongside 25 other serious crimes, and proposes
as additions to this list of serious crimes to be heard by non-customary courts those offences connectedwith
domestic violence in terms of South Africa’s Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998. Sched. 1 of the bill lists
offences which cannot be heard by customary courts. This schedule largely replicates Sched. 3 of the Black
Administration Act 1927.
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for approximately 30 per cent of all reported offences.172 It is through the contested
issue of domestic violence that legal pluralism most concretely affects women,
as demonstrated by Swaine’s ﬁndings above that victims are currently having to
choose between the two systems and are having difﬁculties accessing either, due
largely to poor police training.173 Much of the difﬁculty in this area relates to the
general cultural confusion regarding the nature of the offence of domestic violence.
Domestic violence has marked East Timorese society for centuries, but it was not
considered a criminal offence in East Timor until recently, in the form of an oblique
articulation in the Indonesian Penal Code which has not been widely understood
and was rarely, if ever, prosecuted during the Indonesian occupation.174 Local legal
systemshaveaddresseddomesticviolencemoreaspartof thefabricofsocialrelations
than as an offence. A recent survey of citizen awareness regarding law and justice in
East Timor found thatwhile over 70 per cent of East Timorese participants favoured
the formal court system to hear rape charges, the view on cases of domestic violence
was more equivocal, with 56 per cent favouring the local system over the formal
system, even if the woman is seriously injured.175
Local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) generally appear to be against
using local law or alternative dispute resolution for domestic violence because it
undermines public awareness of the wrongdoing as a criminal offence and also
because theman is invariably favoured by local law.176 Nevertheless, somewomen’s
organizations suchasFokupersoffer theoptionofmediation towomenvictimswith
the view that it should be left to the victim to choosewhichmechanism she prefers,
given the high risk of divorce and social stigma threatened by taking the matter to
the formal legal system.177
Thecurrentpracticeofbeingable toaccesseither system,aspointedoutbySwaine
above, means that local women in East Timor can get some leverage out of having a
choice between the two systems. Is it necessary for the decision to be an ‘either–or’
one?Where the injury isnot serious, itmaybebest inmyview togivewomen inEast
Timor the option to use either as long they are fully informed of the implications
172. In 2001 theUN estimated that 40 per cent of all reported crimeswere offences against women: UNTAET Fact
Sheet 11, April 2002. The JSMP has gathered statistics on cases of violence against women in 2003–4. More
than three-quarters of the total number of offences against women in this period were domestic violence
offences: see JSMP, ‘Statistics on Cases of Violence AgainstWomen in Timor Leste’, February 2005, at 6.
173. On the problems involved in the police investigation of domestic violence cases, see JSMP, ‘Police Treatment
ofWomen in Timor Leste’, January 2005, at 15–16.
174. See Arts. 351–6 of the Code onmaltreatment. Art. 356 stipulates that the penalty will be increased by a third
if the crime is perpetrated against a spouse. World Bank, ‘International Development Association Country
Assistance Strategy for the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste for the Period FY06-FY08’, 22 June 2005, at
20.
175. Asia Foundation, supra note 36, at 80–1. This belief that local law is an appropriate or useful mechanism
for dealing with domestic violence is borne out by a survey conducted by Swaine of 23 female victims of
domestic violencewhich shows thatmore thanhalfwent initially to the police but two-thirds of thematters
were ultimately resolved by ‘local justice’. She comments that ‘women themselves fear the full power of the
formal system and want sensitive issues such as domestic violence to be dealt with within the realm of the
family’: supra note 81, at 14.
176. This debate also existsmore broadly. On the one hand, for example, RenateAlexander argues that ‘mediation
shouldnever be pursued in family lawmatters’ because it perpetuates power inequalities,whileHilaryAstor
argues that ‘If the target of violence makes a free and informed consent to use mediation she should be able
to do so’: seeH.Astor andC. Chinkin,Dispute Resolution inAustralia (2002), 353, andmore generally at 349–55.
177. InterviewwithManuela Leong Pereira, the Director of Fokupers, Dili, 17 June 2005.
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of their choice. It is vital that it is the victims whomake this choice rather than the
police, and that their decision is respected by the chosen system.178 This optionwill
ensure that victims can choose between a system that garners considerable local re-
spect anda systemthatoffers greater enforcementpowers, dependingon thecircum-
stances. Importantly, parties to local dispute resolution shouldbegiven theability to
opt out of the local jurisdiction and into the courts, even if proceedings have begun.
8. CONCLUSION
While attempts to balance international and local norms have met with varied
success in Africa and the Paciﬁc region, it is apparent that systematic educational
programmes are required to assist communities and customary law in the process
of adapting to ideas of constitutionalism, democracy, and equality.179 Without such
programmes, international normsmay be close to meaningless at the local level.180
This ismadeclearbyBennett,who, speaking in relation to theAfricancontext, states,
It isnecessary toremember that formanypeople theConstitution isanalien transplant,
and without advance publicity, careful education and a serious attempt to make legal
forumsmore accessible, people atwhom the fundamental rightswere aimedwill be in
no position to act on them.181
This statement is apposite for a country such as East Timor where, according
to the Asia Foundation’s survey, a third of the population have no idea what the
Constitutionmeans.182 ThegovernmentofEastTimorhasanopportunity to remedy
178. Note that the previous draft lawonDomestic Violence explicitly removed police discretion to refer domestic
violence cases to traditional leaders: see supra note 42, Section 9(9).
179. On the success of the balancing of such norms, see generally K. Brown and J. C. Care, ‘Conﬂict in Melanesia:
Customary Law and the Rights of Women’, (1998) 24 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1334. See also their con-
clusion regarding systematic programmes, at 1351. On the short-term success of educational programmes
in East Timor, Swaine comments: ‘inherent cultural practices, beliefs and norms are so powerful that even
with education in the era since Independence, standards of human rights and other modern concepts are
bothmisunderstood and completely lost due to themassive gap between these concepts and the realities on
the ground’. Supra note 81, at 14.
180. This is outlined by Xanana Gusma˜o in his 2001 New Year’s speech to the nation:
What seems to be absurd is that we absorb standards [such as democracy and equality] just to pretend we
look like a democratic society and please ourmasters of independence.What concernsme is the non-critical
absorption of (universal) standards . . . [and] that the East Timorese may become detached from their reality
and, above all, try to copy somethingwhich is not yet clearly understood by them. (See H. Charlesworth and
M.Wood, ‘WomenandHumanRights in theRebuildingof EastTimor’, (2002) 71Nordic Journal of International
Law 325, at 335)
181. T.W. Bennett,Human Rights and African Customary Law (1995), at 47.
182. This group is largely made up of the uneducated, small-town residents, as well as older women in both
urban and rural areas. TheAsia Foundation survey found that of the remaining two-thirds of the population,
28 per cent see the Constitution as the source of law, 8 per cent believe that it means law and order, 7 per
cent see it as the rules for an independent country, while 15 per cent understand it vaguely as ‘a way of life
or guidance for citizens’. See supra note 36, at 33. Perhaps this is linked to the level of participation in the
process of drafting of the constitution; 41 per cent of the population believe that there was not genuine
public participation in this process. See supra note 36, at 34. Note that the Constitution was drafted by an
elected 88-member Constituent Assembly which was dominated by Fretelin members. The process took
six months, during which 13 constitutional commissions took place to conduct popular consultation. See
H. Charlesworth, ‘TheConstitution of East Timor,May 20, 2002’, (2003) 1 International Journal of Constitutional
Law 325.
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this situation of low community awareness and understanding of constitutional
values and principles through the implementation of educational programmes
when the Constitution is reviewed by the National Parliament in 2008.183 The role
of East Timor’s highest court is to set the standard of the rule of law appropriately so
as to ensure that all lawmakers and those whowork in the justice sector respect the
Constitution and its values.Moreover, East Timor’s lawmakersmust ensure that the
public can readily access andunderstand the formal legal process and the applicable
law.
This paper has used East Timor as a case study in order to point out themanifold
dangers in the operation of some forms of legal pluralism in post-conﬂict coun-
tries with weak state legal systems. It may be useful in assisting countries such as
Afghanistan, where local law councils (known as jirgas or shuras) are strong but
the state system and its constitutional norms are frail.184 In these situations, the
power of local leadersmust bemonitored to protect against bias and discrimination
and to ensure restraint. The rule of law is deﬁcient when there is confusion within
communities as to the applicable law due to inconsistencies between local law and
the formal legal system. Nevertheless, legal pluralism itself is important because
without local legal systems, the weak state legal system in these countries will be
overwhelmed and hence undermined. Classic legal pluralism is more capable of
serving the rule of law because it provides for the monitoring of local courts and
local law, aprocess that shouldensure thatwomengetbetter access to, and treatment
by, the justice system as a whole. However, this process of harnessing local law in
some form should not be allowed to rob it of its dynamic and accessible nature.
It is clear, however, that classic legal pluralism will only succeed in serving the
rule of law if somemodiﬁcations aremade to both the procedures and the substantive
content of local law. Procedurally, local law in East Timor needs to be properly
enforced, less arbitrary, and administeredmore impartially; substantively, local law,
under the ultimate supervision of East Timor’s highest court, must be reconciled
with fundamental norms such as human dignity and equality which permeate East
Timor’sConstitution.At the same time, attentionmust alsobegiven to formal law to
ensure that it isnotdetrimental to theruleof law: itmustbecomeeasier toaccess, and
more clear and comprehensible so that all persons can understand it. Perhaps East
Timor’s current state legal system could be ‘localized’ by embracing some aspects
that are central to local law, such as the process of consulting with the families of
the victim and perpetrator as well as the village council in the determination of
punishment.185
183. This review is required by s. 154 of the Constitution, which provides: ‘1. It is incumbent upon members of
Parliament and the ParliamentaryGroups to initiate constitutional revision. 2. TheNational Parliamentmay
revise the constitution after six years . . . 3. The period of six years for the ﬁrst constitutional review shall
commenceon theday thepresent constitution comes into force.’ S. 155provides that amajority of two-thirds
of Parliament is required for amendment. S.156 insulates from revision certainmatters including ‘the rights,
freedoms and guarantees of citizens’ and ‘the independence of the courts’.
184. See A. Wardak, ‘Building a Post-war Justice System in Afghanistan’, (2004) 41 Crime, Law and Social Change
319.
185. Mearns, supra note 7, at 55.
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In effect this paper advocates a view of the rule of law such as that offered by
the UN Secretary-General. This deﬁnition is arguably amaximalist view186 because
it goes beyond procedural requirements such as public promulgation of laws and
the avoidance of arbitrariness, the mainstays of a minimalist position,187 to assert
that the rule of law also requires that laws be ‘consistent’ with international human
rights norms and standards.188 This position requires an element of scrutiny of the
substantive content of the laws being applied and enforced. In East Timor, both the
procedures and content of local lawmust be carefully scrutinized inorder to observe
the rule of law.
The maximalist position is, however, an ambitious one that carries the risk of
failure, which explains why the international community often rejects this path
in its assistance to transitional countries. In her study of low-income post-conﬂict
transitional countries, Beyond Retribution, Rama Mani points out that a minimalist
position is undoubtedly easier for the international community, as it requires little
sensitivity to localculturalnorms,andleavessuchsubstantive issues for thenational
government to determine.189 She advocates the ‘maximalist’ position because in her
view the minimalist position is a form of lowering of standards which fails to
safeguard fundamental values. She asserts that international programmes need to
assist transitional governments to strive for the maximalist position, and, indeed,
doubtswhether the international community can repudiate its responsibility in this
area.190 This is true in the case of East Timor, where the international community,
under the banner of the United Nations, assumed signiﬁcant responsibility for
enabling the independence process and initiating rule-of-law programmes. Indeed,
UNTAET’s administration required that East Timor comply with the core human
rights treaties during its administration, thus showing an intention to monitor
the substantive content of East Timor’s laws. For this reason, the international
community has the responsibility to assist East Timor in striving for a maximalist
view of the rule of law.
One of the problems often suffered by transitional states, according to Mani, is
the lack of local pressure and resources to focus sufﬁciently on important questions
such as that of legal pluralism so as to take all factors into account.191 Without
186. See R. Mani, Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows ofWar (2002), at 25–31.
187. A minimalist view broadly regards it to be about the establishment and maintenance of law and order:
rules and procedures are applied and enforced regularly and consistently by an independent and impartial
judiciary. It focuses on the need to guarantee predictability in legal relationships and hence it rejects
retroactive and arbitrary laws. It emphasizes that the law should be clear, easily accessible, comprehensible
and relatively stable. See J. Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’, in J. Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law
and Morality (1979), at 210–11. See more generally D. Dyzenhaus (ed), Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of
Legal Order (1999).
188. Themaximalist position requires that laws complywith fundamental concepts of human dignity and other
international human rights standards. The content of the law is prioritized over the procedural nature of the
law. See generally R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986) andAMatter of Principle (1985).
189. Mani, supra note 186, at 77. Speaking generally, Mani warns that the international community should not
follow this route as ‘Ahost of dangersmightﬂow fromthis relinquishingof responsibility for the substantive
content of the rule of law.’ For example, she questions whether governments, left to their own devices, ‘have
the necessary political will to put in place a “maximalist” rule of law that is appropriate to the needs and
aspirations of its society, and cognizant of its cultural realities and traditions’: ibid., at 78.
190. Ibid., at 80.
191. Ibid.
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international pressure, there is a risk that government efforts will ‘unwittingly
reinforc[e] iniquitous practices or undesirable power authorities, out of deference to
local customs, culture and leaders’.192 The challenge, then, is for the international
community to assist post-conﬂict states such as East Timor in terms of offering
resources and providing expertise with regard to comparative studies, so that East
Timor can ﬁnd a path to engaging with local law that preserves stability while
addressing procedural and substantive problems with local law. Exactly how this
engagement between the two legal systems shapes is amatter for local consultation
and decision-making. The governmentmust not attempt to bypass real community
debate on these important questions.
To conclude, any engagement between local law and state law in East Timor will
necessarily involve the process of reconciling constitutional and local norms. This
challenging but essential process can be labelled ‘legal vernacularization’, because
adaptation and transformation is a two-way process.193 While pragmatism requires
that the post-conﬂict countries harness local law into their legal framework, at the
same time the local sphere must be encouraged to promote, absorb, and adapt con-
stitutional norms such as equality so as tomake these norms local andmeaningful.
192. Ibid., at 84.
193. See S. E.Merry, ‘Legal PluralismandTransnationalCulture: TheKaHo’OkolokolonuiKanakaMaoli Tribunal,
Hawai’I, 1993’, in R. A.Wilson (ed.)Human Rights, Culture and Context: Anthropological Perspectives (1997).
